In this work we consider the following hazmat transportation network design problem. A given set of hazmat shipments has to be shipped over a road transportation network in order to transport a given amount of hazardous materials from specific origin points to specific destination points, and we assume there are regional and local government authorities that want to regulate the hazmat transportations by imposing restrictions on the amount of hazmat traffic over the network links. In particular, the regional authority aims to minimize the total transport risk induced over the entire region in which the transportation network is embedded, while local authorities want the risk over their local jurisdictions to be the lowest possible, forcing the regional authority to assure also risk equity. We provide a linear bilevel programming formulation for this hazmat transportation network design problem that takes into account both total risk minimization and risk equity. We transform the bilevel model into a single-level mixed integer linear program by replacing the second level (follower) problem by its KKT conditions and by linearizing the complementary constraints, and then we solve the MIP problem with a commercial optimization solver. The optimal solution may not be stable, and we provide an approach for testing its stability and for evaluating the range of the its solution values when it is not stable. Moreover, since the bilevel model is difficult to be solved optimally and its optimal solution may not be stable, we provide a heuristic algorithm for the bilevel model able to always find a stable solution. The proposed bilevel model and heuristic algorithm are experimented on real scenarios of an Italian regional network.
Introduction
The transportation of hazardous materials (hazmats), though may be classified among the more general freight transport issues, is an activity that presents extremely typical characteristics. What differentiates hazmat shipments from the transportation of other materials is the risk associated with an accidental release of hazardous materials during transportation. To reduce the occurrence of dangerous events it is necessary to provide appropriate answers to safety management associated with dangerous goods shipments.
It was estimated that more than 4 billions of hazmat tons were being transported annually at world wide level in the first half of the current decade (Zografos and Androutsopoulos, 2004) : in the USA, there are at least 300 million hazmat shipments each year, and totally approximately 3.2 billion tons (Kara and Verter, 2004) ; in Italy, 74 millions of hazmat tons were transported on trucks in 2001 (Infodatamix, 2002 . In USA, in 1998, there were roughly 15,000 incidents related to hazmat transportation, and only 429 of them were classified as serious incidents (Kara and Verter, 2004) . Despite the number of such incidents is very small compared to the number of hazmat shipments, due to the potential magnitude of accidents to the population and the environment, the public is very sensitive to the dangers of hazmat transportation activity; therefore, the risk associated with incidents involving hazmat shipments have found considerable attention from the government, encouraging research on hazmat transportation.
Risk assessment and hazmat shipments planning are two of the main research fields in hazmat transportation. In the literature, a lot of work has already been done in risk assessment, by modeling risk probability distribution over given areas, for example, taking into account the risk related to the transported material and the transport modality (Abkovitz et al., 1984) and the environmental conditions (Patel and Horowits, 1994) . For a survey the reader is referred to, e.g., .
One of the main issues of hazmat shipments planning is routing hazmat shipments, that involves a selection among the alternative paths between origin-destination pairs. From a carrier's perspective, shipment contracts can be considered independently and a routing decision needs to be made for each shipment, which we call the local route planning problem. At the macro level, hazmat routing is a "many to many" routing problem with multiple origins and destinations. In the sequel, we refer to this problem as global route planning.
The local route planning problem is to select routes between a given origin-destination pair for a given hazmat, transport mode, and vehicle type. Thus, for each shipment order, this problem focuses on a single-commodity and a single origin-destination route plan. Since these plans are often made without taking into consideration the general context, certain links of the transport network tend to be overloaded with hazmat traffic. This could result in a considerable increase of accident probabilities on some road links as well as leading to inequity in the spatial distribution of risk.
Transport costs are the carriers' main focus. In contrast, a government authority, charged with the management of hazmat shipments within and through its jurisdiction, has to consider the global problem by taking into account all the shipments in its jurisdiction. Although the transportation industry has been deregulated in many countries, hazmat transportation usually remains as part of the governments' mandate mainly due to the associated public and environmental risks. This leads to a harder class of problems that involve multi-commodity and multiple origin-destination routing decisions, i.e., the global route planning problem.
The main concern for a government authority is controlling the risk induced by hazmat transportations over the population and the environment. Besides the minimization of the total risk, a government authority should also promote equity in the spatial distribution of risk. This becomes crucial in the case in which certain populated zones are exposed to intolerable levels of risk as a result of the carriers' routing decisions.
into account the cost-minimizing behavior of the carries. In their model, hazmats are grouped into categories based on risk impact, and a network is designed for each group, without considering the interactions among shipments of hazmats of different categories. The bilevel integer programming problem is transformed into a single-level mixed integer linear problem by replacing the follower problem by its KKT conditions and by linearizing the complementary slackness constraints. Then, the latter mixed integer problem is solved using a commercial optimization software. It has to be remarked that the single-level mixed integer linear model may fail to find an optimal stable solution for the bilevel model. In fact, in general, there are multiple minimum-cost routing solutions for the follower over the designed network established by the leader, which may induce different total risk values over the network. We note that Kara and Verter (2004) do not take into account such an issue. Erkut and Alp (2007) consider a single-level hazmat transportation network design problem, restricting the network to a tree, so that there is a single path between each couple of origindestination pair; with this restriction, the carriers have no alternative paths on the tree, hence the carriers have no freedom in route selection, with the result that the structure of the proposed model has a single level. They formulate the tree design problem as an integer programming problem with the objective of minimizing the total risk, which is solved using a commercial optimization software. They also propose a greedy heuristic that adds shortest paths to the tree so as to keep the risk increase to a minimum and allow carriers to select cheaper paths. Erkut and Gzara (2008) consider a similar problem of Kara and Verter (2004) , generalizing their model considering the undirected network case and designing the same network for all the shipments. They consider the possible lack of stability of the solution of the bilevel model obtained by solving the single-level mixed integer linear model, and propose a heuristic solution method that always find a stable solution. Moreover, they extend the bilevel model to account for the cost/risk trade-off by including cost in the objective function of the leader (first level) problem.
All the previous papers adopt a link-based formulation for the carriers' problem, while Verter and Kara (2008) provide a new path-based formulation for the hazmat transport network design problem they studied in (Kara and Verter, 2004) , where the open links in the given road network chosen by the regulator determine the set of paths that are available to the carriers. This facilitates the incorporation of carriers' cost concerns in regulator's risk reduction decision, and allow to formulate the problem with a single-level integer programming formulation, that assure that the cheapest path among the available ones is used by each carrier.
All the models studied in the literature in the field of hazmat network design consider the government and the carriers points of view trying to mitigate the risk only from a macroscopic point of view but without considering the need to distribute the risk in an equitable way over the region in which the transportation network is embedded; in fact, the choices of the carries, that is related to the cost, could overload, in terms of risk, some links of the network, implying a lack of risk equity. This could be inadequate when there are multiple layers of government authorities being involved in the regulation of dangerous goods shipments (as, for example, is common in Europe and North America), that are responsible at different geographical levels, e.g., regional area authorities and local area authorities. In such a scenario, a regional area authority aims to minimize the total risk over its controlled area, while a local area authority wants the risk over the local populated links of its jurisdiction to be the lowest possible.
In this paper, we study a new model for hazmat network design addressing also the concept of risk equity. The problem we consider is the following: a set of hazmat shipments has to be shipped over a road transportation network in order to transport a given amount of hazardous materials from specific origin points to specific destination points, and we assume that there are government authorities (at different levels, e.g., regional and local) that want to regulate the hazmat traffic by restricting the use of network links to the hazmat shipments with the aim of minimizing the total risk of the shipments, on the one hand, and spreading the risk equitably over the geographical region in which the transportation network is embedded, on the other hand. The former aim concerns that of a regional area authority, while the latter one goes in the direction of the aims of local area authorities (that are responsible to regulate the hazmat traffic inside their local area contained in the regional area) that would like avoiding local populated links in their jurisdictions to be overloaded in terms of induced risk by hazmat transportation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that pays particular attention to the jurisdictional differences within different authorities.
We formulate the hazmat network design problem with a linear bilevel model where at the higher (leader) level there is a meta-local authority (acting on behalf of all the involved local area authorities) that aims to minimize the maximum link risk over populated links of the whole network, that is, risk equity, and at the lower (follower) level there is the regional area authority that aims to minimize the total risk over the network. This corresponds to the existence of two decision makers, one (the regional authority) willing to define a feasible hazmat flow assignment on the network that induces the minimum total risk over the population, and the other (representing the local authorities) that, interpreting the optimal flow assignment of the previous (lower level) decision maker as a flow vector, minimizes the maximum link risk on the network, i.e., aiming at risk equity, by defining capacities over the network links that restrict the possible choices of the regional authority.
The reason for using such a modeling approach follows from the fact that the local and the regional authorities act as multiple decision makers and in many cases they do not cooperate (e.g., because they are controlled by different parties, as often happens in Italy); hence, a simple multiobjective single-level model does not adequately represent such a case, while the bilevel model better represents the scenario where there is a hierarchy of decision makers where the leader (i.e., the meta-local authority) tries to minimize the maximum link risk imposing some restrictions on the amount of hazmat traffic over the links of the network in terms of link capacities, leaving to the follower decision maker (i.e., the regional authority) the freedom to choose the specific amounts of hazmat traffic to be routed over the capacitated network in order to minimize the network total risk.
In Figure 1 , we report the conceptual comparison between our model and that of Kara and Verter (2004) . In particular, our problem is a network design one, where the goal is not that of determining a subgraph of the whole transportation road network, but it is to determine (link) capacities leading to a balanced risk over the population as evenly as possible. Note that, differently from what happens in the model of Kara and Verter (2004) , in our model two types of authority actors are represented, without considering the role of the carriers. Even if we do not take into account the point of view of carriers, the model formulation helps in defining restrictions to the amount of hazmat flowing through the network links without imposing specific routes to carries. In fact, in general, there are multiple-flow assignments for which we get the same minimum total risk and minimum maximum link risk equal to the values achieved by the bilevel model, and, hence, a certain freedom can be left to the carriers in selecting the cheapest one among these flow assignments. In order to solve the linear bilevel model proposed, we transform the latter into a single-level mixed integer linear program by replacing the follower problem by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and by linearizing the complementary constraints, and then by solving the MIP problem with a commercial optimization solver. The optimal solution of the bilevel model may not be stable, and we provide an approach for testing its stability and for evaluating the range of maximum link risk values when the solution is not stable. Moreover, since the bilevel model is difficult to solve optimally and the solution may not be stable, we provide a heuristic algorithm for the bilevel model able to always find a stable solution. The proposed model and heuristic algorithm are experimentally evaluated on an Italian geographical region.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall bilevel optimization and review the existing methods for solving bilevel problems. In Section 3, we give the linear bilevel problem formulation and its reduction to a single-level mixed integer linear program. In Section 4, we show why the solution of the bilevel model could not be stable, and give an approach for checking its stability. In Section 5, we provide the heuristic algorithm. Section 6 presents the model and heuristic algorithm experimentations on real cases of an Italian region. Finally, in Section 7 we provide some conclusions and remarks, and describe how the carriers can identify the cheapest flow assignment among the multiple-flow assignments for which we get the same minimum total risk and minimum maximum link risk equal to the values achieved by the bilevel model.
Bilevel optimization review
A bilevel mathematical program (see, e.g., Bialas and Karwan, 1984) concerns two optimization problems hierarchically related. We can interpret such problems as that of two decision makers in which the optimal decision of one of them (called the leader) is constrained by the decision of the other decision maker (called the follower). The follower decision maker optimizes his/her objective function under a feasible region that is defined by the leader decision maker. The latter, with this setting, is in charge to define all the possible reactions of the second level decision maker and selects those values for the variable controlled by the follower that produce the best outcome for his/her objective function. A general formulation of such problem is the following:
where ξ 1 is a vector of m 1 variables controlled by the leader, and ξ 2 is a vector of m 2 variables controlled by the follower. f 1 (ξ 1 , ξ′ 2 ) and f 2 (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) are the objective functions of the leader and of the follower, respectively. S 1 is the feasible region of the higher level (leader) problem, and
is the feasible region of the lower level (follower) problem which depends on the values of the variables controlled by the leader. This formulation corresponds to the optimistic one, and implies that whenever the optimal solution set ) , ( min arg ) ( , i.e., the follower reaction set, does not reduce to a singleton for some ξ 1 , the leader may select any solution ξ′ 2 ∈ S′(ξ 1 ) that suits him best; let ξ * 2 be such a solution. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that the follower will choose the best solution ξ * 2 for the leader, and the value of the leader objective function f 1 (ξ 1 , ξ′ 2 ) may be grater than f 1 (ξ 1 , ξ * 2 ) for a certain ξ′ 2 ∈ S′(ξ 1 ). In this case the solution ξ 1 chosen by the leader is not stable.
Bilevel programs are very closely related to the van Stackelberg equilibrium problem (van Stackelberg, 1952) , and the mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (see, e.g., Luo et al. 1996) .
The most studied instances of bilevel programming problems have been for a long time the linear bilevel programs, and therefore this subclass is the subject of several dedicated surveys, such as that one by Wen and Hsu (1991) . Over the years, more complex bilevel programs were studied and even those including discrete variables received some attention, see, e.g., Vicente et al. (1996) . Hence, more general surveys appeared, such as those by Vicente and Calamai (1994) and Falk and Liu (1995) on non-linear bilevel programming. The combinatorial nature of bilevel programming has been reviewed in Marcotte and Savard (2005) .
Bilevel programs are hard to solve. In particular, linear bilevel programming has been proved to be strongly NP-hard (see, Hansen et al., 1992) ; Vicente et al. (1996) strengthened this result by showing that finding a certificate of local optimality is also strongly NP-hard.
Existing methods for bilevel programs can be distinguished into two classes. On the one hand, we have convergent algorithms for general bilevel programs with theoretical properties guaranteeing suitable stationary conditions; see, e.g., the implicit function approach of Outrata et al. (1998) , the quadratic one-level reformulation of Scholtes and Stohr (1999) , and the smoothing approaches of Fukushima and Pang (1999) and Dussault et al. (2004) . With respect to the optimization problems with complementarity constraints that represent a special way of solving bilevel programs, we can mention the papers of Kocvara and Outrata (2004) , Bouza and Still (2007) , and Fukushima (2003, 2005) . The first work presents a new theoretical framework with the implicit programming approach. The second one studies convergence properties of a smoothing method that allows the characterization of local minimizers where all the functions defining the model are twice differentiable. Finally, Fukushima (2003, 2005) present two relaxation methods.
Exact algorithms have been proposed for special classes of bilevel programs, e.g., see the vertex enumeration methods by Candler and Townsley (1982) , Bialas and Karwan (1984) , and Tuy et al., (1993) applied when the property of extremal solution in bilevel linear program holds.
Complementary pivoting approaches (see, e.g., Bialas et al., 1980, and Faustino, 1992) have been proposed on the single-level optimization problem obtained by replacing the second level optimization problem by its optimality conditions. Exploiting the complementarity structure of this single-level reformulation, Bard and Moore (1990) and Hansen et al. (1992) , have proposed branch-and-bound algorithms which appear to be among the most efficient. Typically branch and bound is used when the lower level problem is convex and regular, since the latter can be replaced by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, yielding a single-level reformulation. When one deals with linear bilevel programs, the complementarity conditions are intrinsically combinatorial and in such cases branch-and-bound is the best approach to solve this problem (see, e.g., Colson et al., 2005) .
Cutting-plane approach is not frequently used to solve bilevel linear programs. Cutting-plane methods found in literature are essentially based on Tuy's concavity cuts (Tuy, 1964) . White and Anandalingam (1993) use these cuts in a penalty function approach for solving bilevel linear programs. Marcotte et al. (1993) propose a cutting-plane algorithm for solving bilevel linear programs with a guarantee of finite termination. Recently, Audet et al. (2007) , exploiting the equivalence of the latter problem with a mixed integer linear programming one, propose a new branch and bound algorithm embedding Gomory cuts for bilevel linear programming. For the above reasons, since, as we will show next, our bilevel model is a linear one, in the following we will adopt the single-level mixed integer linear programming formulation for the bilevel model, and a resolution strategy based on branch and bound rules.
The bilevel model formulation
Let the road transportation network be represented by an undirected network G = (N, E), with N and E being the set of n nodes (crossing points) and the set of m (undirected) links (road segments that connect the crossing points) of the network, respectively. Let C be a set of hazmat shipments (in the following called also commodities), and, for each hazmat shipment c ∈ C, let s c and t c be respectively the source node (origin point) and the sink node (destination point) in the network, and let d c be the amount of hazmat to be shipped from s c to t c in a given time horizon (e.g., a month).
W.l.o.g., we assume that in G there is at least a path connecting the source node s c to the sink node t c , for each c ∈ C. Moreover, w.l.o.g., we assume that each link <i, j> ∈ E can be traversed in both directions; let A = {(i, j), (j, i)} : <i, j> ∈ E } be the set of (directed) arcs induced by set E of links, where arc (i, j) ∈ A represents link <i, j> when traversed from node i to node j.
Let ρ ij c be the unitary risk of arc (i, j) ∈ A related to commodity c ∈ C, that is, the risk induced over link <i, j> ∈ E by a unit of flow of commodity c ∈ C that traverses that link from node i to node j, and let ρ ji c be the risk induced over the same link <i, j> by a unit of flow of commodity c ∈ C that traverses that link in the opposite direction. When being not explicitly stated, we assume that According to the conceptual scheme of our model the bundle capacities {y ij } are the variable controlled by the leader decision maker, who wants to minimize the value of λ by imposing specific limits on the amount of flows {x ij c } on the links of the network, which are the variables controlled by the follower decision maker who aims to minimize the value of R tot .
Referring to the general bilevel formulation given in Section 2, in our model the set S 2 represents all the multi-commodity feasible flow assignments along with bundle capacities in a capacitated transportation network, where the bundle capacity vector y = {y ij } is the vector ξ 1 of the variables controlled by the leader, the feasible multi-commodity flow assignment x = {x ij c } is the vector ξ 2 , and the feasible region S 2 (ξ 1 ≡ y) of the follower problem contains all the multicommodity feasible flow assignments x = {x ij c } on the network with bundle capacity vector y. Therefore, once bundle capacities are fixed by the leader decision maker, the lower level (follower) problem that the follower decision maker wants to solve becomes a minimum cost multicommodity network flow problem, where the arc cost models the unit risk of traversing the arc, with a specific hazmat shipment (commodity) c ∈ C of d c units being associated with a couple (s c ; t c ) of source-sink nodes. The set of optimal solutions of this latter problem is the follower reaction set S′ 2 (ξ 1 ).
In the following, we give the bilevel formulation. The first formulation is the higher level formulation that models the leader problem P1 of assuring an equitable distribution of the risk over the network given a minimum network total risk multi-commodity hazmat flow by the follower decision maker. The model minimizes the value of the maximum link total risk λ among the link total risk λ <i,j> values of the links <i, j> of the network G, finding appropriate arc capacities y ij for each arc (i, j) ∈ A. Let λ * be the optimal solution value of the leader problem, that is the minimum possible value for λ. Constraints (1) say that the link total risk over each link <i, j> ∈ E cannot be greater than λ, while (2) are nonnegative constraints on the arc bundle capacities. The second formulation is the lower level formulation that models the follower problem P2 of minimizing the network total risk R tot induced by a (feasible) multi-commodity flow assignment x = {x ij c }, given the capacity vector y = {y ij } imposed by the leader decision maker. Let R * tot (y) be the optimal solution value of the follower problem, that is the minimum network total risk value given the bundle capacity vector y.
Being FS(i) = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ A} and BS(i) = {j ∈ N : (j, i) ∈ A} respectively the forward and backward stars of each node i ∈ N, constraints (3) impose the conservation of flow at nodes for each commodity. Constraints (4) say that the total flow on arc (i, j) ∈ A should not exceed the arc capacity value y ij . Noting that flows x ij c are variables of the follower problem and capacities y ij the variables of the leader problem, the minimization of the network total risk R tot is assumed over the x ij c variables, and the minimization of λ over the y ij variables.
The model is a bilevel linear program, i.e., the objective functions and the constraints are linear. Following the approach proposed by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981) , we reformulate the linear bilevel model, as made also by Kara and Verter (2004) , by replacing the follower problem P2 with the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions into the leader problem P1, thus obtaining a singlelevel optimization problem. Therefore, in the following, we will transform our bilevel program into a new single-level problem called P3, assuming that P2 is the primal formulation from which we want to define its optimality conditions, i.e., complementary slackness and primal and dual feasibility. To this aim let us define: Now, we give the new single-level optimization problem P3, where we considered the optimality conditions of the follower problem P2 into the leader problem P1. Note that the complementary slackness conditions (6) and (7) are quadratic constraints. Moreover (see constraints (8)), dual variables associated with primal equality constraints are free in sign. Constraints (6) and (7) Note that, due to constraints (13) and (14), pairs of constraints (9)- (10) and (11)- (12) 
Solving the bilevel model
When solving problem P4, besides the optimal solution y * = {y * ij } of the bilevel model which is the best leader choice, we also get the best (from the leader point of view) multi-commodity flow assignment x B = {x * ij c } that the follower may choose among the minimum network total risk flow assignments given bundle link capacities {y * ij }, that is, among all his/her indifferent choices over the capacitated network established by the leader. The optimal solution value λ * of the bilevel model is equal to the maximum link total risk induced by flow assignment x B . Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the follower will adopt flow assignment x B if there are multiple minimum network total risk flow assignments on the capacitated network, and in this case the optimal solution y * of the bilevel model might be unstable, that is, the follower may adopt a flow assignment x′ different from x B , and the maximum link total risk λ′ induced by x′ may be greater than λ * .
For example, let us consider the network of Figure 2 (a) where we have exactly two disjoint paths from node 1 to node 4, i.e., path P 1 = (1, 2, 4) and path P 2 = (1, 3, 4). Let us consider two hazmat commodities c = 1, 2, and assume that we have to move 100 hazmat units from node 1 to node 4 for both commodity 1 and 2 (i.e., d 1 = d 2 = 100) over the network, where the risk per unit flow flowing on each link <i, j> in both the directions is equal to 1 and 2, respectively for commodity 1 and 2 (i.e., ρ ij 1 = ρ ji 1 = 1 and ρ ij 2 = ρ ji 2 = 2, for each <i, j> ∈ E). Paths P 1 and P 2 are the only available paths for sending hazmats for both the two commodities. Since, for both commodities, the risk per unit of flow over the two paths P 1 and P 2 is the same (i.e., equal to 2 and 4, for commodity 1 and 2, respectively), every feasible flow assignment on the network links gives the same network total risk R tot of value R * tot = 600, which is the minimum value for R tot . However, one of the best case for the leader would be if the follower divided the total amount of each commodity in two equal amounts of 50 units each, and ship each one of these latter amounts on different paths. That is, for each commodity, 50 units of flow will be assigned to arcs (1, 2) and (2, 4) of path P 1 , and 50 units of flow will be assigned to arcs (1, 3) and (3, 4) of path P 2 ; in this case the value of λ, being the maximum among the link total risk over each link of the network, is equal to λ * = 150, which is the lowest possible value for λ; this flow assignment corresponds to the best flow assignment x B from the leader point of view (see Figure 2(b) ). Therefore, in order to try to force the follower to choose flow assignment x B , the leader will fix bundle arc capacities y ij to y * ij = 100 for arcs (1, 2), (2, 4), (1, 3) and (3, 4), and to y * ij = 0 for all the other arcs of A; let therefore the capacity vector y * be the optimal solution of the bilevel problem. But with these capacity values, the follower has multiple minimum network total risk flow assignments for shipping the two hazmat commodities from node 1 to node 4, which have the same network total risk R tot of value R * tot = 600 but different λ values. For example, the minimum network total risk flow assignment, denoted with x W and shown in Figure 2(c) , where all the amount of commodity 1 is shipped along path P 1 and all the amount of commodity 2 is shipped along path P 2 has network total risk R tot equal to R * tot = 600 and λ equal to λ W = 200. Note that, from the leader point of view, x W is the worst flow assignment that the follower may choose among the minimum network total risk flow assignments given bundle link capacities y * ij , since it produces the maximum value for λ. Therefore, since the leader cannot impose to the follower to choose flow assignment x B in order to achieve the minimum value λ * for λ, the optimal solution y * = {y * ij } of the bilevel problem is not stable. When the optimal solution y * = {y * ij } of the bilevel model is not stable, the leader might be interested in evaluating the gap between λ * , that is the optimal (minimum) value of λ (achieved if the follower adopts the best flow assignment x B = {x * ij c } from the leader point of view) and its worst (maximum) value λ W (achieved if the follower chooses the worst flow assignment x W , among the minimum-total risk flow assignments given bundle arc capacities y * ij ). If this gap is too large, the leader may prefer to (heuristically) find a stable feasible bundle arc capacity assignment {ŷ ij }.
Before testing the stability of the optimal solution y * = {y } is the solution of problem P4 and, hence, corresponds to the best multi-commodity flow assignment x B from the leader point of view. With this reinforcement we consider (possibly) another optimal solution of the bilevel model that might have more chance to be stable than the previous one.
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A heuristic approach
In this section we describe a heuristic approach for finding a stable feasible solution of the bilevel model, inspired by Erkut and Gzara (2008) . The heuristic approach we propose is an iterative algorithm that at each iteration constructs a feasible solution y H of the bilevel model, and tests its stability using the same approach as the one discussed in the previous section. If y H is stable, the algorithm stops; otherwise, the algorithm removes a link and starts a new iteration with the residual network. When the algorithm stops, the stable heuristic solution y H = {ŷ ij } on the original network is obtained by setting ŷ ij = ŷ ji = 0, for each removed link <i, j> from the original network.
In the following, we show the criterion for the selection of the link to be removed, and prove that after a number of iterations less than the number of network links the algorithms stops with a feasible stable solution for the residual network.
At each iteration the algorithm works as follows. It computes a new heuristic solution y H of the bilevel model by solving the optimization problem, denoted with Only_Leader, of the overregulated scenario where the leader directly imposes the flow assignment on the network that optimizes its own criterion, that is the minimization of the maximum link total risk λ among all the links of the (residual) network G. The problem Only_Leader is therefore an uncapacitated multicommodity network flow problem where the objective is the minimization of the maximum link total risk λ, and is formulated as follows. Modified_Only_Leader this latter problem. Note that, with this value of γ, we minimize λ and R tot in lexicographical order (i.e., among the solutions with minimum λ value, we find that one of minimum R tot value).
Let x^ = {x^i j c } be the optimal solution of problem Modified_Only_Leader, and let λ^ = max <i,j>∈E {∑ c∈C (ρ ij c x^i j c + ρ ji c x^j i c )} be the related maximum link total risk. The heuristic solution y H = {ŷ ij } is constructed from solution x^ by setting the bundle capacity value ŷ ij of arc (i, j) equal to the total flow on that arc, that is ŷ ij = ∑ c∈C x^i j c . Let λ H = λ^ be the solution value related to the feasible solution y H .
Let us assume, therefore, that the leader imposes the bundle capacities y H = {ŷ ij } on the network. The follower finds an optimal flow assignment on the capacitated network that minimizes the network total risk; this corresponds to solve the follower problem P2 formulated in Section 3. Let R * tot (y H ) be the optimal solution value of this latter problem, that is, the value of the minimum network total risk on the capacitated network G with bundle link capacities vector y H .
For 
, with 1 ≤ h ≤ q, and 1 ≤ k ≤ r. For any other commodity c ≠ ĉ for which there exists a path P 1 c connecting the origin node s c to the destination node t c and with link <i, j> ∈ P 1 c (e.g.,
), with φ ≥ 1 and ω ≥ 1), there exists also path P 2 c (in Figure 3 ,
)) that does not contain link <i, j>. Therefore, in the residual network obtained after the removal of link <i, j> from the network G, there exists at least one path connecting the source node s c to the sink node t c , for each commodity c ∈ C. □
Figure 3:
The subgraph of the paths in the proof of Theorem 1. , for each c ∈ C, implies that in the capacitated network with bundle capacities ŷ ij the optimal follower solution is unique and equal to solution {x^i j c }. Hence, also in this case, the heuristic algorithm stops with a stable solution.
□ For the sake of completeness, in the following we sketch the steps of the proposed heuristic.
Heuristic algorithm

Repeat
Step 1. Solve problem Modified_Only_Leader; let x^ = {x^i j } be the optimal solution and λ^ = max <i,j>∈E {∑ c∈C (ρ ij c x^i j c + ρ ji c x^j i Let us consider again the network example introduced in Section 4, and apply the heuristic algorithm (Figure 4(a) shows the network data). Figure 4 shows the execution of iteration 1.
Step 1 solves problem Modified_Only_Leader, and the solution x^ = {x^i j } is depicted in Figure 4 > λ H , the heuristic solution y H = {ŷ ij } is not stable. Therefore, the algorithm removes link <1, 3> from the network and executes iteration 2 (see Figure 5 ).
Step 1 solves problem Modified_Only_Leader on the residual network depicted in Figure 5(a) , and the solution x^ = {x^i j }, with λ^ = 300, is shown in Figure 5 
Figure 5: The heuristic solution: iteration 2.
Experimental analysis
This section shows the computational results achieved by the proposed bilevel model and the proposed heuristic algorithm. We divide this section into four parts. The first one is devoted to analyze the behavior of the bilevel model, implemented in the AMPL language (www.ampl.com) and optimally solved by means of an on-the-shelf branch and bound algorithm like the one embedded in the CPLEX 8.0.1 solver (www.ilog.com). The second part presents heuristic results. The third and the fourth parts of the section is devoted to the comparison of the results of the optimal and heuristic solutions of the bilevel model with the results coming from two opposite scenarios, called over-regulated and under-regulated scenarios (see also Erkut and Gzara, 2008) , respectively, in order to assess the values of the network total risk R tot and of the maximum link total risk λ obtained by the bilevel model and the heuristic algorithm.
In the over-regulated scenario only the leader decision maker is considered, with the leader that directly imposes the flow assignment on the network G, optimizing his/her own criterion, that is, minimizing the maximum link total risk λ among the links of the network. This consists in solving the linear program Only_Leader introduced in Section 5; let x L be the optimal solution (flow assignment), and let λ L be its optimal solution value, that is, the minimum value of the maximum link total risk λ among the links of the network in the over-regulated scenario. Clearly, λ L is a lower (a) {100, 100}
bound on λ * and, hence, λ L ≤ λ * ≤ λ H . Moreover, let us denote with R L tot the network total risk value associated to the flow assignment x L .
In the under-regulated scenario only the follower decision maker is considered, who therefore aims to find a multi-commodity network flow over the uncapacitated network to minimize the network total risk R tot . This corresponds to solve the linear program P2 introduced in Section 3 with unlimited bundle capacities (i.e., y ij = +∞, for each (i, j) ∈ A) on the network G; let us denote with Only_Follower this latter problem. Let x F be the optimal solution (flow assignment) of the Only_Follower problem, and let R F tot = R * tot (+∞) be its optimal solution value, that is, the minimum network total risk value in the under-regulated scenario. Clearly, R F tot ≤ R * tot (y), for any (nonnegative) capacity vector y. Moreover, let us denote with λ F the maximum link total risk value associated to the flow assignment x F . Figure 6 shows the optimal solutions of the over-regulated and under-regulated scenarios for the network example introduced in Section 4: Figure 6(a) shows the network data, and Figures 6(b) and 6(c) show the optimal solutions of the over-regulated and under-regulated scenarios, respectively. The linear programming models for the over-regulated and under-regulated scenarios have been implemented, as for the single-level mixed integer linear programming model reformulation of the bilevel model, by means of the AMPL language and solved with CPLEX 8.0.1. The heuristic algorithm was implemented in the C language. All the algorithms ran on a PC with a Pentium IV processor and 2GB of RAM.
λ F = 300 R F tot = 600
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed model and algorithm, we concentrated our analysis on a real-world case study. We considered the road network of the Lazio region (located in the middle of Italy), and, in particular, its main transport roads, for an overall size of n = 311 macro- computed as the number of people living inside the exposure zone around link <i, j> (whose size depends on the hazmat type m(c)) times the accident probability involving the vehicle. We considered from 2 to 10 origin-destination pairs on the network, each one associated with a number of commodities ranging from 1 to 3, for an overall number of shipments (commodities) between 2 and 30 (we recall that in our model each commodity is associated with one origin-destination pair). With each one of the latter scenarios we associated 10 instances; each instance has been generated by assigning uniformly at random a demand from 100 to 1,000 tons to each shipment. Figure 7 shows the road network and the 10 origin-destination points for the hazmat shipments. In Tables 1 and 2 , we report the main features of the bilevel model which help in analyzing its performance. In particular, the columns of Table 1 show: -ns, the number of shipments (commodities); -Inst, the instance ID; -# reinf., the number of capacity values being reinforced after the solution of the bilevel model;
-λ * , the optimal solution value of the bilevel model, i.e., the minimum value of the maximum link total risk λ;
, the minimum network total risk over the capacitated network with bundle capacity vector y * imposed by the leader;
-Capacity ratio, computed as the ratio (in percentage) [
], the performance indicator that measures the restriction imposed by the leader on the decision of the follower.
-B&B nodes, the number of branch and bound nodes generated when solving problem P4; -Simplex iterations, the total number of simplex iterations in the bounding process; -Cpu time bilevel, the cpu time (in seconds) spent to solve the bilevel model; -λ W , the worst (maximum) value for the maximum link total risk λ among all the optimal flow assignments of the follower on the capacitated network with bundle capacity vector y * imposed by the leader; -Cpu time stability, the cpu time (in seconds) needed to check the stability of the solution of the bilevel model. Table 1 shows results for the case with ns = 2 and 3 shipments. Indeed, the B&B algorithm of CPLEX 8.0.1 was able to optimally solve within 3 hours of cpu time limit only these classes of instances. As can be inferred by the table, the solutions found are always stable, i.e. λ * = λ W . The cpu time spent to find the optimal solutions ranges from 3 seconds to 4,710 seconds, while the cpu time needed to test to solution stability ranges from 1.2 to 65.5 seconds (note that the stability check is performed by solving at most m linear programs). Even if, for each given ns value, both λ * and
values have a wide range of variability over the 10 instances, we can observe that the λ * values are quite robust with respect to different ns values. In particular, the former ranges from about 4,000 to 19,300, and the latter from about 62,000 to 617,000 when ns = 2; when ns = 3, λ * varies from about 6,400 to 19,300 and R * tot (y * ) from about 303,000 to 1,330,000. None reinforcement is appreciable for ns = 2 and only one instance has such parameter greater than zero (i.e., see instance 4) when ns = 3. Clearly, the number of generated branch and bound nodes tends to grow-up substantially (sometimes by more than two orders of magnitude) as soon as we pass from 2 to 3 shipments, and this sheds light on why CPLEX 8.0.1 is unable to optimally solve, within the imposed time limit of 7,200 seconds, instances with more than 3 shipments. For this reason, when ns is greater than 3, we optimally solved the linear relaxation of the single-level mixed integer linear programming formulation of the bilevel model in order to have a lower bound on the optimal solution value.
In Table 2 , we report such values, denoted with λ LR , for all the instances and reported the number of simplex iterations (see column Simplex iterations) and cpu time as well (see column Cpu time bilevel lin. rel.). Clearly, cpu times are very limited, i.e., about 1 second for ns = 5 to about 10 seconds for ns = 30. This lower bounding phase is particularly useful as soon as in the following we discuss heuristic results (reported in Table 3 ).
Note that we have not reported in Table 2 Similarly for Table 1, in Table 3 we reports the results of the heuristic algorithm listing the λ H values (i.e., the solution values returned by the heuristic algorithm), the R * tot (y H ) values (i.e., the minimum network total risk over the capacitated network with bundle capacity vector y H ), the capacity ratio, and the cpu time in seconds spent by the algorithm (see column Cpu time heuristic).
We start noting that the heuristic algorithm performed only one iteration for every instances (this is why we did not list the number of iterations); this means that the heuristic solutions y H = {ŷ ij } of the bilevel model determined at the first iteration (with ŷ ij = ∑ c∈C x^i j c for each (i, j) ∈ A, where x^
} is the optimal solution of problem Modified_Only_Leader on the given network G) is stable, and, therefore, the algorithm immediately exits from the repeat-until loop (see the algorithm pseudo-code for details).
Comparing the λ H values obtained by the heuristic to the lower bound values λ LR in Table 2 and the optimal values λ * in Table 1 , we note that λ H = λ * , for ns = 2, 3, and λ H = λ LR , for ns = 5, 10, 20, 30; hence, for all the test instances, the solution of the bilevel model determined by the heuristic algorithm is indeed optimal. The capacity ratio increases on average with ns from 0.60% (for ns = 2) to 1.37% (for ns = 30). Heuristic algorithm running times are quite limited: indeed, they are never greater than 7 minutes over all the instances tested. Recall that, for each iteration, the heuristic algorithm solves O(m) linear programs.
In Table 4 , we report the values obtained by solving problem Only_Leader for the over-regulated scenario. In particular, its optimal solution values λ L are useful to assess the quality of the λ values for the bilevel model obtained optimally or heuristically. In fact, the λ L values in Table 4 represent the best (lowest) values for the maximum link total risk that can be obtained by the leader, i.e., in the over-regulated scenario in which the leader directly decides the flow assignment. It is interesting to note that for the bilevel model both its optimal solutions (for ns = 2, 3) and the solutions provided by the heuristic algorithm (for ns = 5, 10, 20, 30) Following what we have done in Table 4 , in Table 6 we report the values obtained by solving problem Only_Follower for the under-regulated scenario. In particular, its optimal solution values R Table  6 are the best (lowest) values for the network total risk that can be obtained by the follower, i.e., in the under-regulated scenario where the follower decides the flow assignment without limitations on flows coming from the leader. For completeness, 
Conclusions and final remarks
In this work, we have proposed a bilevel network flow model for hazmat transportation network design. The proposed model aims to minimize total risk and to guarantee risk equity. The model represents a scenario where there are multiple layers of government authorities being involved in the regulation of dangerous goods shipments (as, for example, is common in Europe and North America), that are responsible at different geographical levels, e.g., regional area authorities and local area authorities. In such a scenario, a regional area authority aims to minimize the total risk over its controlled area, while a local area authority wants the risk over the local populated links of its jurisdiction to be the lowest possible.
We formulate the considered hazmat network design problem with a linear bilevel model, where at the higher (leader) level there is a meta-local authority (acting on behalf of all the involved local area authorities) that aims to minimize the maximum link risk over populated links of the whole network, that is, risk equity, and at the lower (follower) level there is the regional area authority that aims to minimize the total risk over the network. This corresponds to the existence of two decision makers, one (the regional authority) willing to define a feasible hazmat flow assignment on the network that induces the minimum total risk over the population, and the other (representing the local authorities) that, interpreting the optimal flow assignment of the previous (lower level) decision maker as a flow vector, minimizes the maximum link risk on the network, i.e., aiming at risk equity, by defining capacities over the network links that restrict the possible choices of the regional authority.
The proposed linear bilevel model is transformed into a single-level mixed integer linear problem by replacing the follower problem by its KKT conditions and by linearizing the complementary slackness constraints. Then, the latter mixed integer linear problem is solved using CPLEX 8.0.1. The MIP formulation is difficult to be solved exactly, and, more importantly, the optimal solution obtained may be a non-stable solution of the bilevel problem; therefore, we also provide a heuristic algorithm for the bilevel model able to always find a stable solution. The proposed model and heuristic algorithm are experimentally evaluated on an Italian geographical region.
The experimentation shows that CPLEX 8.0.1 were able to solve the MIP formulation within a reasonable time only for instances with at most three shipments on the given network with 311 nodes and 441 links, and that the heuristic algorithm was able to give always an optimal stable solution in all the test cases, that is, with the best (minimum) possible maximum link total risk. Moreover, if we compare the solutions given by the MIP solver and that ones provided by the heuristic algorithm, we can note that the latter ones are able to give a better solution in terms of network total risk values. This is due to the fact that the heuristic constructs a feasible solution for the bilevel model taking into account the objective of the follower, who aims to minimize the network total risk, while the bilevel model only considers the reaction of the follower for a given choice of the leader. This would suggest a possible future work devoted to study a multi-objective version of the proposed bilevel model, that accounts for maximum link risk/network total risk tradeoff by including the network total risk in the higher level objective. Several other refinements may be introduced to the basic model presented in this paper. For example, one may change the objective of the lower level problem considering the total cost of the shipments; another possible modification could be considering also the population density of the people living in the neighbour of each link, and in the higher level formulation minimize the maximum exposure of the population of each link.
Even if the proposed model does not consider explicitly the carriers' point of view, it should be pointed out that the solution ŷ of the bilevel model is not entirely prescriptive. is the minimum network total risk achievable by the follower with the given leader choice ŷ , and λˆ is the solution value of the bilevel model (i.e., the maximum link total risk value) related to solution ŷ . Therefore, the maximum link total risk and the network total risk associated with the solution that the carriers would adopt are not grater than those offered by the bilevel model solution.
A final remarks is devoted to the way the authorities can implement the flow levels and the desired capacities. Indeed, our model is in charge to provide the bundle arc capacities associated with a given set of transportation demands in a certain time horizon, in order to design the network, and to establish the hazmat flow level, that is, the amount of hazmat shipped along each network arc in the given time horizon, for each shipment; the operational phase, i.e., the phase of assigning a schedule to the carriers' routes, is successive to the tactical one considered in our model, and has to be implemented also by monitoring the fleet of vehicles scheduled over time, that is, by monitoring that, within the given time horizon, the total amount of hazmat of each shipment, that is shipped along each network arc, does not exceed the limit established by the flow assignments on that arc decided in the tactical phase.
